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COMES NOW, Petitioners Lt. Gov. Phil Bryant, in his private and individual capacity,
on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ryan S. Walters, Michael E. Shotwell and
Richard A. Conrad, et al, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (hereinafter
referred to as APetitioners@), by and through their attorney of record, and file this Memorandum
In Support of their Response to Defendants= Motion to Dismiss and would respectfully show
unto the Court the following:
BACKGROUND
This Court, on February 2, 2011, filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Defendants=Motion to Dismiss, finding that that Athe ten primary Petitioners have not pled
sufficient facts to establish that they have standing to challenge the Constitutionality of the
minimum essential coverage provision of the [Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act],@ and
further holding that Ait is generally appropriate to permit plaintiffs an opportunity to correct
jurisdictional defects in their complaint.@ After discussing what it considered to be technical
deficiencies in Petitioners= Amended Complaint, the Court gave Petitioners thirty days in which
to file an amended petition. Thus on March 4, 2011, Petitioners timely filed their Second
Amended Petition, which contained numerous and specific allegations designed to comport with
the Court=s Order on Defendants= Motion to Dismiss.
The averments in the Second Amended Petition easily establishes that Petitioners "will be
forced to purchase insurance or, alternatively, to pay a tax penalty," as the Court set forth in its
previous order. See Memorandum Opinion and Order [26], p. 19. The amendments establish
that the Petitioners will be considered "applicable individuals" in a number of factual ways,
instead of merely alleging bare legal conclusions. Id. Plaintiffs have also shown that they will
-1-
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"incur the tax penalty for their noncompliance" with concrete, particularized factual allegations.
Id. In every respect mentioned by the Court, Petitioners have responded by making the factual
allegations necessary for standing. However, instead of filing an answer to the Petitioners=
Second Amended Petition, Defendants have responded with a premature and untimely Rule
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss in Part and for Jurisdictional Discovery. In their haste to urge
dismissal of certain claims at the threshold, Defendants ask the Court to stretch and distort the
constitutional law of standing, and to confuse principles governing jurisdiction with adjudication
on the merits. There is a considerable difference between establishing standing for the purposes
of avoiding a motion to dismiss and establishing standing sufficiently to avoid summary
judgment.
As the Second Amended Petition makes clear, Petitioners are profoundly affected by '
1501 of the PPACA B the Act=s so-called AIndividual Mandate@ B a requirement that virtually all
Americans obtain and maintain a congressionally approved level of healthcare insurance
coverage for themselves and their families and their dependents or else face a penalty. Each and
every Petitioner herein earnestly desires an adjudication of their claims, and therefore file this,
their Memorandum in Support of Petitioners= Response to Defendants= Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to
Dismiss in part and for Jurisdictional Discovery.
ARGUMENT
I.

SINCE DEFENDANTS HAVE ONLY ASSERTED A RULE 12(B) AFACIAL@
CHALLENGE TO THE SECOND AMENDED PETITION, PETITIONERS HAVE
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A BASIS OF THE COURT=S SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION.
For purposes of this motion, which relates to standing, the Court must assume that the
conduct of which Petitioners complain is unconstitutional:
-2-
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Because an adjudication of the question of standing is not an
adjudication on the merits, we must assume that the conduct of
which Cramer complains is unconstitutional. Warth, 422 U.S. at
502, 95 S.Ct. at 2207 (“We also assume, for [standing] purposes ...
that such ... practices, if proved in a proper case, would be
adjudged violative of the constitutional ... rights of the persons
[affected].”).

Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir. 1991). The Warth case quoted by the Fifth
Circuit also makes it clear that all material allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true
and construed most favorably to the petitioners:
One further preliminary matter requires discussion. For purposes
of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial
and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of
the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the
complaining party. E.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421422, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848-1849, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). AStanding is a threshold inquiry; it requires focus on
the party seeking to have his complaint heard in a federal court, and it eschews evaluation of the
merits. The court is not to consider the weight or significance of the alleged injury, only whether
it exists.@ Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 168 (8th Cir.1974) (emphasis
added).
It is improper for Defendants to argue about the facts contained in our Second Amended
Petition, since they have made a facial attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction, not a
factual one. The Fifth Circuit recognizes a distinction between Afacial attacks@ and Afactual
attacks@ on a court=s subject matter jurisdiction. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-13
(5th Cir. 1981); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). Facial
attacks on the complaint require a court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently
-3-
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alleged a basis of subjectBmatter jurisdiction, and the allegations in the complaint are taken as
true. A facial attack requires a court merely to decide if the plaintiff has correctly alleged a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction by examining the allegations in the complaint without making
findings of fact. See Menchaca, supra at 511.
"Different standards apply when a litigant challenges standing on a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)
motion than on a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. When a court considers
standing on a motion for a Rule 12(b) dismissal, it must accept the allegations in the pleadings as
true." Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir. 1991), citing Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3184, (1990). Since Defendants offer nothing more than a simple facial
attack on Petitioners= Second Amended Petition, Petitioners are left with basically the same
safeguards used with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Rule
12(b)(1), can be based on the lack of jurisdiction on the face of the
complaint. If so, the plaintiff is left with safeguards similar to those
retained when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is raised-the court must consider the allegations in the
plaintiff's complaint as true. E.g., Spector v. L Q Motor Inns, Inc.,
517 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1975); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970).
Williamson v. Tucker, supra at 412. The procedural safeguards under a Rule 12(b)(1) facial
challenge and Rule 12(b)(6) are essentially the same. See Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692
F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982), citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412 (5th Cir. 1981). The central
inquiry under the Williamson analysis is whether the 12(b)(1) motion attacked the petition on its
face, or whether the motion attacked the asserted factual basis of jurisdiction. Id. at 412-13. If the
motion to dismiss is a Afacial@ attack on the petition, then the reviewing court must consider the
allegations and exhibits in the Petitioners= complaint as true. Id. at 415-16.
-4-
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Inarguably, only Rule 12(b) standards can apply to this motion, even if Defendants or
Petitioners present facts pertaining to jurisdiction that are not contained within the pleadings (i.e.,
the Petition); the Fifth Circuit has concluded that a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is
not converted to a Rule 56 motion when the trial court considers matters outside the pleadings.
Attwell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 1157, 1161 (5th Cir.1979) (citing Edwards v. Associated
Press, 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.1975); 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil §
1351, p. 565). Rule 12(b) standards therefore still apply, and all facts stated in the Petition must
be considered to be "true."
The court=s review of facial attacks like the instant one is restricted to an examination of
whether the complaint sufficiently alleges jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d
521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). In determining whether Petitioners have alleged sufficient facts to have
standing, only the Second Amended Petition may be considered; there are no facts in dispute, as
there has been no opportunity to dispute or develop any extraneous facts. Consequently, the
Defendants= challenge is nothing more than a Afacial@ attack on Petitioners= Second Amended
Petition. In this context, it is well established that A[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of
standing, . . . courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.@ In re Coho Energy Inc., 395 F.3d
198,202 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Xerox Corp. v.
Genmoora Corp., 888 F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 1989) (question at the motion to dismiss stage is
whether there is a Afailure to allege injury,@ not whether there is a Ashowing of injury@); Haskell
v. Washington Tp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1276 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing district court=s grant of
defendant=s motion to dismiss on ground that plaintiff lacked standing because allegations in
-5-
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complaint were sufficient to establish standing). In examining facial (or technical) standing
challenges, the Court should construe the petition liberally. See, e.g. Spotts v. U.S., 613 F.3d
559, 566 (5th Cir. 2010).
In light of the above, Petitioners have utilized the widely-recognized concept of notice
pleading, which marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, to allege straightforward allegations of harm. As to each Petitioner, a
number of declarations, including the following, have been asserted:
$

Petitioners have been currently injured by the passage of the
PPACA and the Individual Mandate, despite the mandate=s future
effective date. Second Am. Petition &3.

$

The Individual Mandate currently is enacted into law, and is a
current dictate to perform an act in the future, which therefore
currently robs Petitioners of the blessings of liberty. Second Am.
Petition &3.

$

Enforcement of the PPACA=s Individual Mandate is definitively
fixed in time and impending, and Petitioners specifically aver that
there is a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of
the statute=s operation or enforcement that is reasonably pegged to
a sufficiently fixed period of time and which is not merely
hypothetical or conjectural; that time is the year 2014, when the
Individual Mandate begins implementation. Second Am. Petition
&3.

$

Petitioners each allege that they have no intention whatsoever of
complying with the Individual Mandate or of purchasing health
insurance now or in the future. Second Am. Petition &5.

$

Petitioners also each allege that there is no possible change of
circumstances that might lead them to voluntarily comply with the
Individual Mandate. Second Am. Petition &5.

$

For Petitioners, the idea that the federal government could force
them to purchase health insurance is morally and ideologically
repugnant as well as contrary to their American values of limited
government, and each individual Petitioner will conscientiously
resist the dictate of the PPACA to enter into a contract to purchase
health insurance. Second Am. Petition &5.
-6-
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$

Moreover, as Petitioners desire to maintain their medical privacy,
and as set forth herein, the Individual Mandate constitutes a serious
governmental abrogation of the ancient right to medical privacy.
Second Am. Petition &5.

$

Petitioners herein each specifically allege that they have already
begun to take steps to prepare for the implementation of the
PPACA, that they are presently having to deviate from their
previously set plans in response to the PPACA. Second Am.
Petition &6.

$

Each Petitioner specifically avers that he would not purchase
health insurance in 2014 but for the requirements of the Act, and
each further specifically avers that he intends to disobey the
PPACA by failing to purchase health insurance despite the
Individual Mandate. Second Am. Petition &6.

$

Petitioners specifically aver that there are present detrimental
effects upon each Petitioner due to the PPACA. Second Am.
Petition &7.

$

Though the Individual Mandate begins implementation on January
1, 2014, Petitioners specifically aver that it has already begun to
take effect, since it has affected each Petitioner in concrete and
adverse ways. Second Am. Petition &7.

$

Each Petitioner specifically avers that he is currently arranging his
financial affairs differently than he otherwise would in order to
prepare for the January 1, 2014 implementation of the Individual
Mandate. Second Am. Petition &7.

$

Each Petitioner further specifically avers that he is making
decisions to forego certain spending today, so that he will have the
funds to pay for the penalties associated with his noncompliance
and the associated legal costs of defending himself for his
noncompliance when the Individual Mandate begins
implementation on January 1, 2014. Second Am. Petition &7.

$

Each Petitioner specifically avers that the impending enforcement
of the Individual Mandate has forced them to make significant and
costly changes in their personal financial planning, necessitating
significant lifestyle changes and extensive reorganization of their
personal and financial affairs. Second Am. Petition &7.

$

Petitioners specifically allege that the loss of their medical privacy
and the economic consequences to them of either purchasing
insurance or paying for the penalties and legal costs of defending
themselves for their noncompliance with the Individual Mandate
-7-
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are not just possible future injuries, but are certainly impending
injuries. Second Am. Petition &8.
$

Petitioners seek to avoid the certain consummation of these
injuries by obtaining preventive relief through this lawsuit. Second
Am. Petition &8.

$

Each Petitioner specifically avers the certainly impending
implementation of the Individual Mandate causes them to currently
experience fear, anxiety and emotional distress over their loss of
medical privacy, their loss of individual freedom of choice, and the
economic consequences to them of either purchasing insurance or
paying for the penalties and legal costs of defending themselves for
their noncompliance with the Individual Mandate. Second Am.
Petition &8.

$

Petitioners further specifically allege that each of these allegations
is capable of proof at the trial that Petitioners seek. Second Am.
Petition &8.

$

Petitioners each specifically allege that the law will certainly be
enforced on each of them. Second Am. Petition &9.

$

Each Petitioner specifically alleges that they are Aapplicable
individuals@ who must comply with the minimum coverage
provision. 26 USC ' 5000A(d)(1). Second Am. Petition &9.

$

Petitioners more specifically factually allege that they are not
incarcerated individuals, see 26 USC '5000A(d)(4), and that they
are citizens of the United States, see 26 USC ' 5000A(d)(3).
Second Am. Petition &9.

$

Every Petitioner further specifically alleges that they do not meet
the requirements for the AReligious exemption@ definition found in
26 USC ' 5000A(d)(2). Second Am. Petition &10.

$

Petitioners each allege that they are not members of Aa recognized
religious sect or division thereof described in section 1402(g)(1)
and an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or
division as described in such section.@ Second Am. Petition &10.

$

Petitioners specifically and explicitly allege that they are not
members of a recognized religious sect or division thereof or an
adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division
by reason of which they would be conscientiously opposed to
acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance which
makes payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, or
retirement or that makes payments toward the cost of, or that
provides services for, medical care (including the benefits of any
-8-
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insurance system established by the Social Security Act). Second
Am. Petition &10.
$

Nor are Petitioners part of any health-sharing ministries for
individuals sharing Aa common set of ethical or religious beliefs
and share medical expenses among members in accordance with
those beliefs.@ Second Am. Petition &10.

$

Petitioners also specifically allege that their incomes are now and
certainly in the future will be above the filing threshold. 26 USC
'5000A. Second Am. Petition &11.

$

Petitioners further specifically allege that their required
contribution (determined on an annual basis) for coverage for any
month does not now and will not in the future exceed 8 percent of
such individual=s household income for the taxable year described
in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the PPACA. Second Am. Petition
&11.

$

Petitioners specifically allege that each individual Petitioner=s
household income for the taxable year described in section
1412(b)(1)(B) of the PPACA is not less than 100 percent of the
poverty line for the size of the family involved (determined in the
same manner as under subsection (b)(4)); see 26 USC
'5000A(e)(1). Second Am. Petition &11.

$

Petitioners specifically allege that they are not members of any
Indian tribes as set forth under 26 USC ' 5000A(e)(4). Second
Am. Petition &12.

$

Petitioners specifically allege that they have not been determined
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section
1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship with respect to the
capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan. Second
Am. Petition &12.

$

Each Petitioner specifically alleges that he is above the age of
eighteen. Second Am. Petition &12.

$

Petitioners further state as a cause of action that the religious
exemption of the PPACA is in itself unconstitutional since it
discriminates against different religious faiths by allowing
followers of one faith who otherwise would be subject to the
Individual Mandate to not comply with the mandate or be subject
to any penalties for such noncompliance, while followers of other
faith (like the religious faiths of Petitioners) are subject to the
Individual Mandate and to penalties for noncompliance. Second
Am. Petition &14.
-9-
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$

The PPACA is an overbearing federal mandate that violates the
right of Petitioners to choose their own health care. Second Am.
Petition &15.

$

Petitioners and all others similarly situated are directly subject to
the PPACA=s Individual Mandate because they do not possess any
form of health insurance and are, as such, classified as uninsured.
Second Am. Petition &42.

$

Moreover, Petitioners do not desire and have no intention to obey
what they consider to be an unconstitutional Individual Mandate
found and described in Court I of the petition. Second Am.
Petition &42.

$

The concrete and future threat of injuries and burdens of
complying with or being punished by the PPACA=s regulatory
scheme and Individual Mandate are presently causing actual and
well-founded worry, fear and anguish on the part of Petitioners.
Second Am. Petition &44.

Accepting these statements of fact as true -- as we must -- Defendants' motion to dismiss
must fail.

AAt the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the

defendant=s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we Apresum[e] that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.@ Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Each of Petitioners sufficiently allege at least
one redressable injury-in-fact which is causally connected to the alleged conduct of the
Defendants, and that is enough to overcome their slight, preliminary standing burden. Since they
have each adequately alleged injury, causal connection, and redressability, nothing more is
needed to confer standing upon the Petitioners at the pleading stage.
Defendants= request to this Court to evaluate the merits of Petitioners= causes of action are
misplaced at this threshold standing stage of the litigation. A[S]tanding in no way depends on the
merits of the plaintiff=s contention that particular conduct is illegal.@ Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500 (1975) (emphasis added). See also Wright, Miller & Cooper, 13 Federal Practice &
-10-
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Procedure: Jurisdiction ' 3531 (2d ed. 2006) (AThe focus on the party also means that standing
is not defeated by failure to prevail on the merits.@). It is well-established Athat the absence of a
valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e.,
the court=s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.@ Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env=t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citing generally 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure ' 1350 n.8 and cases cited (2d ed.1990)). As the Supreme Court stated in Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685, A[j]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which Petitioners could actually recover@
(emphasis added).
II.

ALL PETITIONERS, INCLUDING LT. GOV. BRYANT, HAVE PROPERLY
ASSERTED A VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
MEDICAL PRIVACY RIGHTS.
Petitioners state a valid due process claim against the federal government, because the
Individual Mandate unconstitutionally deprives them of recognized liberty interests in the
freedom to eschew entering into a contract, to direct matters concerning dependent children, and
to make decisions regarding the acquisition and use of medical services, including the personal
right not to disclose privileged and confidential medical information to a corporate stranger. See,
e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep=t of Health,
497 U.S., 261 (1990); Pierce v. Soc=y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Consistent with notice pleading requirements, all petitioners (included Lt. Gov. Bryant)
have recited a number of straightforward and detailed assertions regarding violation of medical
privacy claims, including the following:
-11-

Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP Document 33

Filed 05/20/11 Page 14 of 51

Each and every Petitioner has pled a cause of action based upon
their constitutional right to medical privacy which has been
infringed by the PPACA. Third Am. Petition &15.
Petitioners all specifically allege that they will be required to
divulge confidential medical information to insurance companies if
they enter into a health insurance contract as a result of the
Individual Mandate. Third Am. Petition &15.
The Petitioners who do not currently have health insurance
specifically allege that they do not wish to divulge their
confidential medical information to any insurance company and
would for this reason alone bring this action to contest the
constitutionality of the PPACA and the Individual Mandate. Third
Am. Petition &15.

A.

The PPACA unconstitutionally requires Petitioners to either disclose private
medical information to members of the public (insurance companies) or face a
penalty.
Defendants have now twice admitted the following: "It remains unknown whether plans

might be available that specifically address individual privacy concerns." Def. Mem. [30] at 12;
see also Def. Mem. [14] at 37 (emphasis added). This admission means, at the very least that:
(1) that the PPACA does not have any textual provisions that protect against disclosure of private
medical information; (2) Defendants at least do recognize that Petitioners have valid privacy
concerns.

This is an implicit admission that Petitioners do have standing to contest the

Individual Mandate based upon its affect on their medical privacy.
This concession being made, Defendants nevertheless contend that Petitioners have not
established standing because Anothing in the statutory text of the minimum coverage provision
requires private insurance companies to collect confidential medical information from
individuals, nor does it require individuals to provide such information to insurance companies.@
Def. Mem. P. 7. This argument is cleverly worded, but completely wrong; there may not be a
-12-
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specific statement in the "statutory text" that insurance companies are "hereby required" to
collect confidential medical information or require that such information be provided by
individuals, but the PPACA requires it nonetheless. Defendants' cleverness ignores the reality of
the insurance marketplace and ongoing government actions regarding healthcare, and does insult
to common sense. Defendants' argument would be correct and much more to the point, however,
with the following edits:
"nothing in the statutory text of the minimum coverage provision
requires prohibits private insurance companies to from collect[ing]
confidential medical information from individuals, nor does it
require allow individuals to provide withhold such information to
from insurance companies."
The PPACA's silence on this issue is deafening; by not prohibiting private insurance
corporations from collecting and using (or misusing) confidential medical information, the
PPACA allows it, and by mandating that people purchase such insurance, the PPACA requires
individuals to divulge constitutionally protected private information.
Defendants do not deny that there exists a fundamental right to medical privacy, and even
offers a citation to the helpful case of NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). The Court's
opinion begins with these sentences:
In two cases decided more than 30 years ago, this Court referred
broadly to a constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 97
S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977); Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d
867 (1977).

-13-
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NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 751.1 Certainly, petitioners are seeking to void disclosure of
personal matters in this case. The Court went on to say: "We assume, without deciding, that the
Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon." Id. Petitioners
submit that, for the purposes of this motion relating to standing, the Court must assume that
petitioners' right to medical privacy is constitutionally protected, especially since Defendants do
not deny this and appear to concede the issue. Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir.
1991). ("Because an adjudication of the question of standing is not an adjudication on the merits,
we must assume that the conduct of which Cramer complains is unconstitutional.")

B.

If the disclosure of “private information” to the State is an “unpleasant invasion
of privacy,” then disclosure of private medical information to an insurance
corporation is a much greater deprivation of rights.
In NASA v. Nelson, the Court stated that "Whalen acknowledged that the disclosure of

“private information” to the State was an “unpleasant invasion of privacy,” and that "[f]our
months later, the Court referred again to a constitutional 'interest in avoiding disclosure.'" NASA
v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 751, citing Nixon, 433 U.S., at 457, 97 S.Ct. 2777. If the disclosure of
private information to the state (but not to the public) is an unpleasant invasion of privacy, then
the government's actions in forcing disclosure of private medical information to a publicly held
company is perforce a much greater deprivation of rights.
In a reworked partial quote, Defendant somewhat misstates the holding of NASA by
saying that the case was one "recognizing that, to the extent any privacy interest might be
deemed of constitutional significance, the interest at issue is the interest in 'avoid[ing]
1

Notice that the Court recognized a constitutional right in private information that was broader than just medical
information; certainly, information that is both medical and financial (such as medical billing records) fits within the
definition of "private information."

-14-

Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP Document 33

Filed 05/20/11 Page 17 of 51

unwarranted disclosures' of private information…" Def. Mem. p. 8, citing NASA v. Nelson, 131
S. Ct. 746, 755. Though inaccurately stated, we nevertheless take this as an admission by
Defendant that the Constitution does protect individuals against "unwarranted disclosures of
private information." The Whalen case involved collection of private medical information by the
state of New York; ultimately, the Whalen court found that the state had sufficient safeguards to
protect against "public disclosure," meaning disclosure to members of the public:
In Whalen, the Court upheld a New York law permitting the
collection of names and addresses of persons prescribed dangerous
drugs, finding that the statute's “security provisions,” which
protected against “public disclosure” of patient information, 462
U.S., at 600-601, 103 S.Ct. 2573, were sufficient to protect a
privacy interest “arguably ... root[ed] in the Constitution,” id., at
605, 103 S.Ct. 2573.
In the instant case, however, the federal government is forcing public disclosure by
forcing individuals to divulge medical information of all types to members of the public -namely, to those juridical persons we commonly call "insurance companies." Since these are
publicly held corporations, they are members of the public, and disclosure to them is disclosure
to the public. Certainly, they are not state governmental agencies, as was the case in Whalen.
In short, the Court has acknowledged that there is a constitutional interest in protecting
all manner of "private information," and has specifically found this to be the case with private
medical information. The Court has found a specific statute allowing for a state government to
gather private medical information to be an "unpleasant invasion of privacy," but allowed it only
because it had safeguards against "public disclosures." The PPACA, in contrast, forces public
disclosure of medical information.
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By mandating insurance coverage, the PPACA also mandates disclosure of
private medical information to insurance companies.
Application of the PPACA and the Individual Mandate provisions clearly violates the

fundamental right to medical privacy.

Although the PPACA specifically changes some

insurance industry practices, it leaves others alone. One must assume that Congress was well
aware of a multitude of industry practices, including the gathering of medical information prior
to coverage and the gathering of medical information after coverage has started, especially for
billing purposes. By mandating that people buy health insurance, Congress has mandated that
people subject themselves to a multitude of insurance industry practices; all insurance companies
gather confidential medical information.
To apply for health insurance in this country is a complex undertaking, even for policies
where coverage cannot be denied, such as group plans (under HIPAA, group health insurance
plans cannot deny patients coverage or fix a monthly premium based on their medical history,
disability, or genetic information, though insurers still gather health information before allowing
coverage in order to "rate" the group premium). Usually, a medical exam is conducted on the
applicant, by either a paramedical examiner or by a doctor at a physician=s office. During the
exam, it is customary for the examiner to check and record one=s blood pressure, pulse, height
and weight. Moreover, applicants are usually asked to provide a urine sample, which is screened
for indications of things such as nicotine and certain drugs, elevated sugar levels, and signs of
kidney disease. They are likewise asked to take a blood test to screen for abnormalities that
might be indicative of a variety of medical conditions or to assess the current status of known
medical conditions such as kidney or liver disorders, cholesterol levels, or diabetes. And most
insurance companies also force the applicant to take an electrocardiogram (ECG) to screen for
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irregularities such as an irregular heart beat or rhythm or a decreased supply of blood and oxygen
to the heart.
Additionally, when an applicant applies for an underwritten health or life insurance
policy, he is required to give the insurance company the right to investigate his medical history.
Despite Defendant's protestations that health histories will not need to be given because
applicants cannot be turned down, the PPACA does nothing to change current industry practice,
which is to require health histories for rating purposes even where coverage is guaranteed. For
example:

Exhibit 1, Virginia Group Health Insurance Medical History Form, page 5 (emphasis added).
Notice also that this form acts as a medical release allowing the insurer to gather "information
for the payment of claims" that is valid "for the term of coverage," which means the entire time
that the person is insured. If there could be any doubt that this form requires folks to divulge
sensitive information, consider the following specific information requested:

Section 4: Medical History
1. AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) or HIV
(Human Immunodeficiency Virus)
2. Alcohol abuse, substance abuse, and/or use of illicit drugs
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12. Emotional or mental disorders, including, but not limited to,
depression, manic depression, bi-polar disorder or Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
27. Prostate, testicular, erectile dysfunction
33. If you checked yes to any conditions in Section 4, please
provide full details on each medical condition below.
34. List any prescribed medications not otherwise identified in
Section 4, number 33 (including fertility drugs) that you, your
spouse, or any of your dependents listed on this form are currently
taking. Use additional papers if needed.

Exhibit 1. This intrusive questionnaire is used for rating purposes; apparently, in order to know
how much to charge for health insurance, companies need to know whether we have ever
suffered from depression or erectile dysfunction, or if we are using fertility drugs. Inarguably,
most people would consider this information to be of a highly sensitive nature, deserving of
confidentiality.
Simply put, the federal government is mandating that everyone have medical insurance,
and in order to get an insurance company to underwrite and insure an applicant, one must
sacrifice privacy. And as long as medical privacy is sacrificed voluntarily and without duress,
one has little reason to complain, but being compelled to do so by the government and under
threat of penalty violates acceptable Constitutional boundaries.
Obviously, all of the above and more is conducted as part of the insurance underwriting
process, which is the evaluation of factors B including height, weight, current health, medical
history, family history, occupation, hobbies, driving record, and whether you have ever smoked
tobacco or pot, or even piloted a plane B that may affect eligibility for life insurance at the time
an individual applies. The information is also used to plan ahead for the eventual cost of
-18-
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anticipated payments and to monitor expenses with an eye toward preventative care. And, under
the PPACA, these invasions of privacy will not simply end with the application process. Indeed,
how will the government reimburse healthcare providers, manage expenses and allocate
resources without a dedicated and ongoing report of the procedures, tests, habits and conditions
of individuals who are subject to the act=s mandate? And how will insurance companies manage
their financial responsibilities, government reporting requirements and satisfy regulatory
oversight without demanding a continuation of the existing underwriting process? How can
medical bills be paid unless medical records are reviewed and approved?
To believe that the federal government and the insurance industry are going to suddenly
abandon a process that=s been conducted for decades ignores existing business practices,
common sense and the tendencies of government to hyper-regulate any entity or matter
dependent upon its appropriation process. Indeed, Defendants implicitly acknowledge that this
process will continue, as discussed infra on page 22.
Try as they might, Defendants will never be able to deny that insurance companies will
continue to collect medical billing information under the PPACA and the Individual Mandates.
We anticipate the argument that having insurance companies collect billing information is
harmless, and that no one has a reasonable expectation as to their medical billing information.
Quite often, however, the mere fact that a certain type of medical care has been rendered is of an
extremely sensitive nature. The following redacted passages are from a medical privacy tort case
in which a young adult tried very hard to keep his confidential information (the fact that he was
having STD and HIV testing) away from an insurance company; the insurance company
nevertheless gathered billing information regarding his blood tests, with disastrous results:
-19-
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After explaining the situation to the doctor, he also
explained how he would need to pay in full for the test and wanted
to know if this was possible. The problem for Mr. [Doe] was that
his health insurance was carried by his father, who therefore
received the bills. Mr. [Doe] knew that the bills would reflect the
fact that he had undergone STD testing, including testing for HIV.
Mr. [Doe] has stressed to me that he did not want for his father to
know about any STD testing at all, including the HIV testing. Mr.
[Doe] therefore asked the doctor if it were possible to make two
separate bills, one for the routine asthma check-up, and another for
the STDs tests, so that he could pay the STD test bill that day outof-pocket and have the asthma bill sent to his insurance company.
The doctor informed him she thought it could be done but would
check with the office manager. She left the room to check, and
came back saying that the office manager had informed her that
there would be no problem in having the bills separated per Mr.
[Doe's] request.
Mr. [Doe] was given the STD testing, and went out to pay
the bill… Mr. [Doe] again checked with the receptionist to make
sure that these tests would not show up on any bills going to his
insurance company. She assured him they would not. 2
As one can no doubt guess, the STD and HIV testing information did end up with the young
man's insurance company despite all of the care he took to prevent this from happening.
Although an independent adult, this young man was still on his father's insurance, and his father
received the bill at work. His father’s secretary reviewed the bill, thinking it was for services
rendered for [his] father, and brought the STD testing to his attention. which showed that this test
had been conducted on his son. The level of emotional distress that this caused everyone
involved would be hard to overstate.
This is but one example from the mountain of complaints that Americans make every
year regarding invasions of their medical privacy rights.

2

For example, an individual who

This passage and all other facts set forth herein regarding this matter are taken from a settlement proposal letter in
a tort case handled by undersigned counsel K. Douglas Lee, who attests that these are true and correct statements of
the facts found in his files.
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believes that the HIPPA Privacy Rule is not being upheld can go through the complex process of
filing a complaint with the Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights
(OCR), see 45 C.F.R. 160.306. However, according to the Wall Street Journal, the OCR has a
long backlog and ignores most complaints: "Complaints of privacy violations have been piling
up at the Department of Health and Human Services. Between April 2003 and Nov. 30, the
agency fielded 23,896 complaints related to medical-privacy rules, but it has not yet taken any
enforcement actions against hospitals, doctors, insurers or anyone else for rule violations." Theo
Francis, Spread Of Records Stirs Fears Of Privacy Erosion, Wall Street Journal, December 28,
2006. Unfortunately, HIPPA allows members of the public such as bill collectors, fund raisers,
researchers and marketers to receive our confidential information from our insurers, and the
PPACA mandates that we purchase this insurance. Id. There is thus a direct link between
governmental action (the mandate) and public disclosure of our most private and intimate details.
The example of the young man and his STD testing above amply illustrates how insecure
our medical privacy is when in the hands of our medical insurers, and how the Petitioners fears
are well-founded in this regard. It is disingenuous on Defendants' part to say that PPACA does
not precisely state that individuals must divulge confidential information to insurance companies,
or that the PPACA does not require private insurance companies to collect confidential
information from individuals. The example above is of an adult who did not want vitally
important information being collected by an insurance company at all -- that information was
simply the name of the testing he had undergone.

Clearly, the mere fact that insurance

companies gather information related to medical billing means that they gather confidential
medical information.
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Defendant can point to no section where the PPACA states that insurance companies can
no longer gather any confidential medical information -- including information related to billing.
Indeed, Defendant implicitly acknowledges that this practice will continue by explicitly stating
that "[i]t remains unknown whether plans might be available that specifically address individual
privacy concerns." Def. Mem. [30] at 12; see also Def. Mem. [14] at 37 (emphasis added). As
set forth in Petitioners' response to the previous motion to dismiss, once insurance companies
have our information, we have no control over it.
Privacy groups point out that our medical information is passed around as a commodity
from insurers to other members of the public. For example, the "Coalition for Patient Privacy" is
a diverse coalition of three dozen organizations (including Microsoft and the ACLU), together
with one Senator and a House Member. In a letter to Congress dated January 14, 2009, the
Coalition wrote:

"Personal health information should not be sold and shared as a typical

commodity. Health information is different; it is extremely sensitive and can directly impact
jobs, credit, and insurance coverage. Commercial transfers undermine routine privacy
safeguards, including transparency and accountability." Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
[20] at 85 and Exhibit 1 thereto. The only way for Petitioners to keep their medical information
from being publicly disclosed is by violating the Individual Mandate, and refusing to purchase
health insurance.
Petitioners have clearly alleged that they do not want for insurance companies to gather
their medical information -- Defendants can test this fact during discovery, but cannot contest
that it has been adequately pleaded. Petitioners have also clearly alleged that the PPACA's
Individual Mandate will force them to divulge confidential information to insurance companies -
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- again, Defendants can test this fact through discovery and can even bring a summary judgment
motion relating to our claims. However, it is nonetheless clear that Petitioner's have stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and thus Defendant's jurisdictional attack must fail.

D.

Petitioner Lt. Gov. Bryant has standing to assert his claims in this matter.
The questions relating to Lt. Gov. Bryant boil down to these: (1) Can a currently insured

person have standing to bring an action against the PPACA and the Individual Mandate? (2) Can
a person whose employment is scheduled to end prior to enforcement of the Individual Mandate
have standing?
The answer is "yes." As one court has held, A[t]he fact that the individual mandate and
employer mandate do not go into effect until 2014 does not mean that they will not be felt in the
immediate or very near future. To be sure, responsible individuals, businesses, and states will
have to start making plans now or very shortly to comply with the Act=s various mandates.
Individuals who are presently insured will have to confirm that their current plans comply with
the Act=s requirements and, if not, take appropriate steps to comply; the uninsured will need to
research available insurance plans, find one that meets their needs, and begin budgeting
accordingly; and employers and states will need to revamp their healthcare programs to ensure
full compliance." U.S. Citizens Ass=n v. Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ohio 2010),
judgment entered (Feb. 28, 2011) (emphasis added).
This then begs the question as to whether Petitioner Bryant has pleaded the facts that
allow jurisdiction. He is currently insured, but will not be insured in the near future, since he
employed by the State of Mississippi for a term that ends prior to the date when enforcement of
the Individual Mandate begins. Second Am. Petition &13. Thus, his employer-provided medical
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coverage is scheduled to end, and like every elected official or contractual employee, he needs to
plan for the future. He is a petitioner in this matter, and as such has joined in with the allegations
made by other petitioners regarding their preparations for 2014:
Petitioners herein each specifically allege that they have already
begun to take steps to prepare for the implementation of the
PPACA, that they are presently having to deviate from their
previously set plans in response to the PPACA. Each Petitioner
specifically avers that he would not purchase health insurance in
2014 but for the requirements of the Act, and each further
specifically avers that he intends to disobey the PPACA by failing
to purchase health insurance despite the Individual Mandate.
… Each Petitioner specifically avers that he is currently arranging
his financial affairs differently than he otherwise would in order to
prepare for the January 1, 2014 implementation of the Individual
Mandate. Each Petitioner further specifically avers that he is
making decisions to forego certain spending today, so that he will
have the funds to pay for the penalties associated with his
noncompliance and the associated legal costs of defending himself
for his noncompliance when the Individual Mandate begins
implementation on January 1, 2014. Each Petitioner specifically
avers that the impending enforcement of the Individual Mandate
has forced them to make significant and costly changes in their
personal financial planning, necessitating significant lifestyle
changes and extensive reorganization of their personal and
financial affairs.
Second Amended Petition [27], && 6-7 (emphasis added). Thus, for all petitioners -- including
Petitioner Bryant -- the Individual Mandate "will [ ] be felt in the immediate or very near future."
See Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598, 607–08 (E.D.Va.2010) (determining that because
the individual mandate “radically changes the landscape of health insurance coverage in
America,” it will be felt by individuals, insurance carriers, employers, and states “in the near
future”). Petitioner Bryant's employment is certain to end; while he is seeking other employment
by running for Governor, future employment with the State of Mississippi is not guaranteed.
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Thus, for the purposes of deciding jurisdictional issues, we must consider it as an established fact
that Petitioner Bryant stands uniquely as one who is currently insured, but who has a certainty of
not being insured by his employer in the near future. As such, Petitioner Bryant will have to
confirm that his current plans comply with the Act=s requirements and, if not, take appropriate
steps to comply; the a petitioner who will be uninsured in the near future, he "will need to
research available insurance plans, find one that meets [his] needs, and begin budgeting
accordingly." Id.
Petitioner Bryant is being coerced into undertaking an expenditure, for which the
government must anticipate that significant financial planning will be required "well in advance
of the actual purchase of insurance in 2014." U.S. Citizens Ass=n v. Sebelius, supra. There is
nothing improbable about the contention that the Individual Mandate is causing each and every
petitioner to feel economic pressure today:
I note that at least two courts considering challenges to the
individual mandate have thus far denied motions to dismiss on
standing and ripeness grounds. See Virginia [v. Sebelius ], supra,
702 F.Supp.2d [598] at 607B08 [ (E.D.Va.2010) ] (determining that
because the individual mandate Aradically changes the landscape of
health insurance coverage in America,@ it will be felt by
individuals, insurance carriers, employers, and states Ain the near
future@); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, [720 F.Supp.2d 882,
889], 2010 WL 3952805, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 7, 2010) (A[T]he
government is requiring plaintiffs to undertake an expenditure, for
which the government must anticipate that significant financial
planning will be required. That financial planning must take place
well in advance of the actual purchase of insurance in 2014 ...
There is nothing improbable about the contention that the
Individual Mandate is causing plaintiffs to feel economic pressure
today.@)
U.S. Citizens Ass=n v. Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ohio 2010), judgment entered (Feb.
28, 2011). Petitioner Bryant has averred that he is currently arranging his financial affairs
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differently than he otherwise would in order to prepare for the January 1, 2014 implementation
of the Individual Mandate. For the purposes of deciding this motion, the averments made by the
petitioners must be taken as true. Taking these averments as true, there is no need for additional
discovery before deciding the question of jurisdiction: clearly, Petitioner Bryant has pleaded
sufficient facts to avoid dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
Defendant seems to discount another important aspect of jurisdiction: Petitioner Bryant's
claims that his fundamental constitutional right to medical privacy has been breached by the
Individual Mandate. According to the Second amended petition at paragraph 16, "Plaintiff
Bryant and all other Plaintiffs therefore are specifically contesting the deprivation of their
fundamental constitutional right to medical privacy." Petitioner Bryant specifically alleges that
he is being coerced by an overbearing federal government to comply with the Individual
Mandate, and that he is being coerced into divulging confidential medical information to
insurance companies -- such coercion is constitutionally impermissible.
It is true also that Petitioner Bryant "has no intention of ever divulging confidential
medical information to any insurance company that he is forced to contract with due to the
PPACA and the Individual Mandate." In arguing that that this somehow resolves the problem,
Defendants forget that one cannot comply with the Individual Mandate without allowing
confidential medical information to be divulged (as discussed in greater detail infra). This
means that all petitioners are being forced to choose between their right to medical privacy and
compliance with a federal law that penalizes noncompliance. Thus, the federal government is
penalizing every individual who refuses to comply with the Individual Mandate partly or wholly
because they also refuse to divulge confidential medical information to an insurance company.
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In short, the federal government is penalizing citizens for exercising their fundamental
constitutional rights through use of the Individual Mandate. Clearly, Petitioner Bryant and all
other petitioners have jurisdiction to bring their claims for a deprivation of their constitutional
right to medical privacy.

E.

The Act=s individual mandate expressly violates Petitioners= fundamental rights
they enjoy as part of the Aliberty@ interest under the Fifth Amendment.
In light of the above, it is obvious that if Petitioners are forced, under the individual

mandate, to purchase insurance from a private insurance company, then they will be compelled
to sign a waiver allowing their doctors to provide private and confidential data, including
medical records, to the insurance company for reimbursement. The insurance company will
certainly then be required to forward such confidential information to the government for some
type of regulatory overview. How else is the process to work? How will medical resources be
allocated? How will medical treatment be rendered? To believe that the PPACA can operate
without the sharing of confidential medical information is an affront to common sense and
industry tradition.

Indeed, the medical records alone are replete with sensitive and often

embarrassing confidential information.

Defendants= argument that there is Anothing in the

statutory text of the minimum coverage provision [that] requires individuals to provide such
information to insurance companies@ is of little consequence. Def. Mem. p. 7. Frankly, it is
unnecessary for the PPACA to spell out in detail already existing and required practices in order
for Petitioners= standing to be appropriate, particularly at this stage of the litigation.
PPACA=s silence on this issue is not controlling.
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Of course, the only way to be absolutely certain that confidential medical information
will not be divulged is to allow discovery to proceed after Defendants= Rule 12(b) Motions are
denied. At that stage, the issue of whether confidential medical information will be required can
be formally and finally resolved. Such discovery would also address Defendants= ripeness
arguments, which are nothing more than rehashed suggestions that Acast doubt@ on whether
confidential medical information will be divulged. Def. Mem. P. 8-9. The circumstances
satisfying the constitutional standing requirement also satisfy the ripeness requirement. See
Allandale Neighborhood Ass=n v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm., 840 F.2d 258,
261 (5th Cir. 1988). In any event, there is no Auncertainty@ as to whether the mandate will apply
to Petitioners. The Individual Mandate as written will impact Petitioners, regardless of any
additional administrative action, and its practical application by the agencies enforcing it will not
illuminate the legal issues now raised. This case is fully ripe for adjudication.
In the alternative, since the Defendants have taken the position that confidential medical
information will not be required, then Petitioners will naturally seek an order from the Court
clarifying that they will not be required to provide such information and that no private
information can be gathered from Petitioners and the classes they represent by insurance
companies for any purpose whatsoever (including billing, rating, and so on). If the Court,
consistent with Defendants= concession, enters such an Order, which Petitioners hereby request,
then the issue is moot for purposes of this litigation. Upon receiving the Order, Petitioners will
gladly dismiss their claims for violations of medical privacy, and we can proceed with
consideration of Petitioners' other claims.
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Until then, Petitioners must defend their rights, as the citizens of the United States
possess a fundamental right to be free of government coercion. Put another way, citizens possess
a fundamental right to not be forced against their will to exercise any other right. This freedom
from government coercion is both Adeeply rooted in this Nation=s history and tradition@ and
Aimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty.@ Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Compelling Petitioners to enter into a
private contract to purchase insurance from another entity will legally require them to share
private and personal information with the contracting party.

Specifically, by requiring

Petitioners to abide by the Act=s individual mandate, Congress is also compelling Petitioners to
fully disclose past medical conditions, habits and behaviors. Not only will the insurer be privy to
all past medical information, Congress=s individual mandate will, by necessity, allow the
compelled insurer access to Petitioners= present and future medical information of a confidential
nature. If judicially enforceable privacy rights mean anything, then private and confidential
medical details certainly merit Constitutional protection.

Petitioners should not be forced to

disclose the most intimate details of their past, present and future medical information.
The Act=s individual mandate expressly violates Petitioners= fundamental rights they
enjoy as part of the Aliberty@ interest under the Fifth Amendment. Fundamental rights such as
Athe right to make one=s own health care decisions,@ Athe right to abstain from entering into a
contractual relationship with another private entity@ and Athe right to not be compelled to divulge
private medical information to another private entity@ are deeply rooted in American history and
tradition and implicated by the imposition of the Act. The Act=s individual mandate represents
an abuse of Congressional authority and a clear violation of substantive due process protections,
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since Petitioners benefit from a constitutionally protected interest in making certain kinds of
important decisions free from governmental compulsion.
The right to privacy judicially developed pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments can be understood only by considering both the Petitioners= collective interest and
the nature of the federal government=s interference with it. In short, a judicially recognized right
to privacy protects Petitioners from unduly burdensome interference with their freedom to decide
whether to voluntarily purchase health insurance and to therefore share confidential and
privileged information.
Liberty, at its most basic sense, is the Afreedom from arbitrary or undue external restraint,
especially by a government,@ but liberty also includes Athe absence of a legal duty imposed on a
person.@ Black=s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). The PPACA infringes on this second notion of
liberty. The Act imposes on the people of the United States, collectively and individually, a new
duty to purchase health insurance with required Aminimum essential coverage.@

Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, ' 1501A(b)(1). Crucially, the
PPACA does not tax, regulate, or control a person who is engaged in any positive conduct at all,
but reaches individuals who are by its very definition engaged in no conduct at all. Freedom
from this sort of coercion is implicit in any concept of ordered liberty.
At first blush, this use of government coercion may seem benign. After all, Defendants
may argue that most people purchase health care insurance on their own or through their
employers, and a significant majority of those without insurance would do so were it more
affordable. This reasoning is dangerous to all fundamental liberties. Imagine, for example, if
Congress passed a law requiring people to purchase Aminimum essential@ food. After all, what
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could be more essential to Ahealth@ than healthy food. Under the Act=s logic, most people already
purchase their own food and many who cannot, would do so were more food affordable. If there
were nothing incongruous with liberty and the Act, then Congress would be permitted to require
people to buy the Aminimum essential@ food it deems appropriate. If Congress is capable under
the Constitution of so coercing the people, then it is impossible to fathom any limit to its powers.
This result cannot be countenanced against the Constitution handed down to us by the Framers.
Writing on their intent to protect a broader scope of liberty in the Constitution, Justice Brandeis
wrote, AThey conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone B the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.@ Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)
Making matters worse, if Congress wishes to abridge the fundamental right to be free
from governmental coercion, then such abridgement deserves heightened judicial scrutiny and a
narrowing of the Apresumption of constitutionality@ of the legislation. United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).

The burden is on the government to justify an

infringement of fundamental rights by demonstrating that the legislation is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). After
identifying the rising costs of health care, and the problem of people waiting until injury to
purchase health insurance, the Act identifies the government=s interest in the individual
requirement as, A[s]ignificantly increasing health insurance coverage . . . will minimize this
adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals,
which will lower health insurance premiums.@

Is lowering the price of health insurance

premiums a sufficiently compelling government interest to justify governmental coercion? Is
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requiring individuals to purchase health insurance sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve this
interest? When compared to prior Supreme Court precedent, the PPACA fails this high standard.
For example, in Hirabayashi v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff=s
due process rights yielded to the exigencies of war-time emergency and the legitimate
application of Congress=s war power.

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

Likewise, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff=s right to
refuse medical treatment yielded to the government=s interest in preventing a pandemic. The
rising cost of health care does not pose such a threat as disease or foreign invasion to justify an
infringement of a fundamental right. Requiring those without health insurance to purchase it does
not further a compelling government interest in a narrowly tailored manner. The government
compels those without coverage so as to aggregate those purchases with those it seeks to benefit.
The requirement of minimum essential coverage does not at its core further the interest of those
who fall under the clause=s power, but only those who cannot afford insurance.

As an

alternative, Congress could easily raise revenues via its power to tax and then spend those
revenues to subsidizing those who cannot afford to buy health insurance, without infringing on
the due process rights of the people. However, as currently written, the Act=s provision does not
conform to well-defined modes of constitutionally permissible taxation.
III.

FOR PURPOSES OF A STANDING ANALYSIS, THE COURT IS TO PRESUME
THAT PETITIONERS= ALLEGATIONS EMBRACE THOSE SPECIFIC FACTS
THAT ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM.
A. Petitioners have pled specific facts indicating that they will be subject to the
PPACA=s Individual Mandate.
Defendants spend at least six pages of their memorandum brief in contending that

Petitioners= allegations are Avague, incomplete, and internally inconsistent,@ but at the pleading
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stage, Ageneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant=s conduct may suffice,
for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that
are necessary to support the claim.@ Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521,
529 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561) (alteration in original). Here, Petitioners
have made more than general allegations of harm; they have pled specific facts contending that
the Defendants= actions have caused the Petitioners present harm and will cause them future
harm.
Contrary to Defendants= assertions, there is absolutely no ambiguity as to whether the
Aoriginal ten plaintiffs@ have some form of insurance that they did not Apurchase.@ Def. Mem. P.
10. Nor are Petitioners= allegations inconsistent. The plaintiff discussed in &15 is obviously and
clearly Petitioner Bryant, which admittedly currently has health insurance as part of his present
employment. As made clear in the Second Amended Petition, APetitioners each allege that they
have no intention whatsoever of complying with the Individual Mandate or of purchasing health
insurance now or in the future.@ Second Am. Petition &5. Clearly, &5 was drafted to apply to
the ten original Petitioners and to Petitioner Bryant (who must face the choice of purchasing
insurance Ain the future,@ once his current policy is no longer available). Likewise, the ten
original Petitioners specifically allege that they are Aapplicable individuals@ who must comply
with the minimum coverage provision. 26 USC & 5000A(d)(1). Second Am. Petition &9. The
concept of Aapplicable individuals@ certainly would, by definition, only apply to only those who
do not have insurance. Petitioners also specifically allege that Athe law will certainly be enforced
on each of them.@ Second Am. Petition &9. Of course, the Individual Mandate would not be
forced on each of them, assuming they already had insurance (which they do not). Surely, such
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general allegations (even arguably vague ones), along with the many others asserted, Aembrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.@ Meadowbriar Home for Children,
Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561 (1992)).
In another strange twist, Defendants complain about perceived Ainconsistencies,@ while
juxtaposing two paragraphs of the Second Amended Petition. It is their position that &15 and
&42 somehow work to create unanswered questions for which immediate discovery is required.
Specifically, it seems the Defendants are attempting to ascertain who exactly the Aapplicable
individuals@ are, despite pleadings that make it perfectly clear that Petitioners, other than Lt.
Gov. Bryant, do not possess any form of health insurance. Second Am. Petition && 15, 42.
Put simply, the Petitioners= reference in &15 to those Awho do not currently have health
insurance@ is nothing more than a simple acknowledgment of Lt. Gov. Bryant. Nevertheless, the
so-called inconsistency does nothing to preclude the well-pleaded allegations which proffer that
the other Petitioners do not possess any form of health insurance. And for purposes of the
Court=s standing analysis, the Defendants= position is immaterial, since even one single
Petitioner=s standing affords yet another basis by which the court can consider the
constitutionality of the Individual Mandate. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518 (finding
that only one of the Petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the petition for
review); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (declining to bother to adjudicate a labor
union=s standing where a union member alleged an injury-in-fact); Prejean v. Foster, 83 F. 2d. 5,
8 (5th Cir. 2003) (AIn cases with multiple plaintiffs, the presence of at least one party with
standing makes the case justiciable.@), citing Dep=t of Commerce v. U.S. House of
-34-

Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP Document 33

Filed 05/20/11 Page 37 of 51

Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330 ( 1999); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickmaman, 92
F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that, for each claim, if standing can be shown for at
least one plaintiff, we need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs to raise that claim).
B.

Petitioners= Second Amended Petition is replete with allegations of economic
harm routinely accepted as sufficient for constitutional standing purposes in
PPACA litigation.
Complicating matters, Defendants also question whether Petitioners are suffering present

financial harm or injury, as addressed in &17 of the Second Amended Petition. But, despite
Defendants= protests, for the purposes of a standing analysis in light of notice pleading, the
Petitioners= present injuries do not have to be described with perfect particularity in order to
survive a standing challenge. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992);
Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1996). Furthermore,
A[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct
injury as a result of the statute=s operation or enforcement. But, one does not have to await the
consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.

If the injury is certainly

impending, that is enough.@ Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1145 (N.D. Fla. 2010), quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers
Nat=l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). Nevertheless, the Second Amended Petition is replete
with allegations outlining numerous injuries, financial and otherwise, to Petitioners, including
the following:


That they have already begun to take steps to prepare for the implementation of the
PPACA, that they are presently having to deviate from their previously set plans in
response to the PPACA. Second Am. Petition para. 6.
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That although the Individual Mandate begins implementation on January 1, 2014, it has
already begun to take effect, since it has affected each Petitioner in concrete and adverse
ways. Second Am. Petition para. 7.



That each Petitioner is currently arranging his financial affairs differently than he
otherwise would in order to prepare for the January 1, 2014 implementation of the
Individual Mandate. Second Am. Petition &7.



That each Petitioner is making decisions to forego certain spending today, so that he will
have the funds to pay for the penalties associated with his noncompliance and the
associated legal costs of defending himself for his noncompliance when the Individual
Mandate begins implementation on January 1, 2014. Second Am. Petition para. 7.



That Petitioners have been forced to make significant and costly changes in their personal
financial planning, necessitating significant lifestyle changes and extensive
reorganization of their personal and financial affairs. Second Am. Petition para. 7.
In light of the above, each of Petitioners sufficiently allege at least one redressable

injury-in-fact which is causally connected to the alleged conduct of the Defendants. Since they
have each adequately alleged injury, causal connection, and redressability, nothing more is
needed to confer standing upon the Petitioners at the pleading stage.
Each has alleged a Apocketbook@ injury akin to the direct dollars-and-cents injuries
routinely accepted as sufficient for constitutional standing purposes in PPACA litigation across
the nation. See, e.g, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1146 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (finding standing to be appropriate for individual plaintiff
who simply preferred to direct and divert her resources elsewhere); Thomas More Law Center v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding standing for Plaintiffs who alleged
financial pressures to rearrange their affairs); Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp.
2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (finding that A[t]he present or near-future costs of complying with a
statute that has not yet gone into effect can be an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing@);
Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Heath & Human Services, 2011 WL 223010 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
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2011) (noting that plaintiffs= complaint plausibly sets forth an injury-in-fact in light of allegations
that they must engage in financial preparation for the impending effective date of the individual
mandate); Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011), hearing in banc denied,
2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2011) (finding that adjusting their finances now by setting
aside money to pay the PPACA=s anticipated penalties is an actual injury). Despite semantics,
word games and lengthy briefs, the only confusion here is that created by Defendants, who
would seemingly rather wander the procedural abyss of federal pleading, rather than having the
matter actually and finally addressed on its substantive merits.
Curiously, Defendants also seem to infer that the annual penalty that will be imposed
against Petitioners is so relatively insignificant that Petitioners could not possibly be rearranging
their financial affairs in anticipation of the Act=s date of implementation.

In so doing,

Defendants take the unusual position of seeking jurisdictional discovery on the income and
expenses of each Petitioner. But such an approach belies the premature and unusual nature of
the relief Defendants are seeking. Put simply, there will be more than ample time to engage in
meaningful discovery on the very issues raised in their recently filed 12(b)1 motion. To seek
such relief at this stage B one dedicated to the Afacial@ adequacies of the Second Amended
Petition B is inappropriate and simply another way for Defendants to elevate the applicable
standard of review that Petitioners must overcome, while avoiding a timely ruling on the merits
of the case.
In seeking to transform the instant pleading into what is practically one for summary
judgment, Defendants have also ignored Supreme Court precedent which teaches that the injury
in fact requirement under Article III is qualitative, not quantitative, in nature. See Cramer, 931
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F.2d at 1027; Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, an
alleged injury must be A(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical@ to pass constitutional muster, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations,
footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted), but it need not measure more than an
Aidentifiable trifle,@ United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973); see Save Our Community v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 971 F.2d 1155, 1161 (5th Cir. 1992).

The requirements for standing have been

characterized as Aundemanding.@ North Shore Gas Co. v. E.P.A., 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir.
1991). In SCRAP, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the injury in fact
requirement was limited to Asignificant@ injuries, noting that it has upheld the standing of
plaintiffs with Ano more at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, a $5 fine
and costs, and a $1.50 poll tax.@ 412 U.S. at 689 n.14.
So long as Petitioners allege an actual and particularized injury has occurred, or will
occur, they have met their burden to survive a motion to dismiss. And this, they have clearly
done. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 889 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (AThe
economic burden due to the Individual Mandate is felt by plaintiffs regardless of their specific
financial behavior. The Act does not make insurance more costly, in fact the contrary is
expected; rather the Act requires plaintiffs to purchase insurance when they otherwise would not
have done so.@).
Likewise, despite Defendants= protests to the contrary, A[t]here is nothing improbable
about the contention that the Individual Mandate is causing plaintiffs to feel economic pressure
today.@ Thomas More Law Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 2d at 889, citing Friends of Earth v. Laidlaw
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Environ. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). AIn fact, the proposition that the Individual Mandate
leads uninsured individuals to feel pressure to start saving money today to pay . . . for insurance,
per year, starting in 2014, is entirely reasonable.@ Id. at 889. AParents wishing to send their child
to college often start saving money for that purpose as soon as the child is born, even though the
expense will not be incurred for eighteen years. And while such parents may be diligent in their
saving, making many sacrifices along the way, their child might earn a scholarship to college, or
decide to forego higher education, thus rendering the parents= sacrifices unnecessary. Such
outcomes, however, do not diminish the real financial burden felt by the parents in earlier years.@
Id. ATo be sure, responsible individuals, businesses, and states will have to start making plans
now or very shortly to comply with the Act=s various mandates.@ U.S. Citizens Ass=n v. Sebelius,
754 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ohio 2010), judgment entered (Feb. 28, 2011).
C.

In light of Petitioners= allegations regarding their numerous and diverse
injuries, it is easy for the Court to presume specific facts under which the
Petitioners are harmed by the Individual Mandate.

Though the Defendants apparently disagree, the stage of litigation properly determines
the standing analysis to be conducted. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). In Bennett, a
number of plaintiffs objected to a biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service. Id.
at 157. That biological opinion, which was mandated by the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
suggested that certain reservoirs maintain minimum water levels for the purpose of protecting
indigenous species of life. Id. at 157-58. The plaintiffs complained B in a general fashion B that
such minimum levels would diminish their use of the reservoirs for irrigation and other purposes,
causing them injury. Id. at 160.
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The government, as in the present matter, contended that the plaintiffs had no standing to
bring such a suit. Id. at 161. Specifically, the government argued that the plaintiffs= allegations
failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing Abecause they demonstrate only a
diminution in the aggregate amount of available water, and do not necessarily establish . . . that
Plaintiffs will receive less water.@ Id. at 167. But the Supreme Court, relying on Lujan, rejected
this argument: AGiven Plaintiffs= allegation that the amount of available water will be reduced
and that they will be adversely affected thereby, it is easy to presume specific facts under which
Plaintiffs will be injured.@ Id. at 168 (emphasis added). Because the facts necessary for the
aggregate diminution of available water to harm the Plaintiffs reasonably could be inferred, the
court found the injury-in-fact standing requirement satisfied. See id.
Like in Bennett, the Petitioners= allegations, noted above, have made the instant Court=s
inquiry a simple one, as it is easy for the Court to presume specific facts under which Petitioners
will be injured by the implementation of the PPACA, particularly in light of the stage of
litigation and the straightforward facts presented in the Second Amended Petition. No matter
how Defendants= couch their arguments, they are nothing more than the same regurgitated
positions already soundly rejected in Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1146 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (finding standing to be appropriate for
individual plaintiff who simply preferred to direct and divert her resources elsewhere). See also
Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Heath & Human Services, 2011 WL 223010 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
2011) (noting that plaintiffs= complaint plausibly sets forth an injury-in-fact in light of allegations
that they must engage in financial preparation for the impending effective date of the individual
mandate); Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011), hearing in banc denied,
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11-5047, 2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2011) (finding that adjusting their finances now
by setting aside money to pay the anticipated mandate=s penalties is an actual injury); Liberty
University, Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (finding in PPACA challenge
that A[t]he present or near-future costs of complying with a statute that has not yet gone into
effect can be an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing@); Thomas More Law Center v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding standing in PPACA challenge for
Plaintiffs who alleged financial pressures to rearrange their personal affairs).

IV.

SINCE THERE ARE NO EXTRINSIC FACTS PRESENTED, AND BECAUSE
PETITIONERS HAVE MET THEIR PLEADING BURDEN, JURISDICTIONAL
DISCOVERY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED AT THIS STAGE OF THE
LITIGATION.
As recognized by Defendants, it is highly unusual and traditionally improper for
Defendants to request jurisdictional discovery. Def. Mem. P. 14.
Nevertheless, Defendants are seeking early discovery under the laughable pretext that
somehow it will Apromote efficiency by allowing defendants to determine whether to proceed
with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) or to go forward with briefing on the merits of
plaintiffs claims.@ Def. Mem. P. 9. Defendants make their incredible assertion despite having
already filed more than 104 pages of memorandum briefing with the Court. In fact, the total
number of pages currently dedicated to Abriefing the merits of plaintiffs= claims@ is approximately
235 pages. And that number does not include what will certainly be a detailed and lengthy reply
to this memorandum in support of Petitioners= response.
Efficiency might have been well-served had the instant 12(b)(1) motion been filed more
than one-year ago, before the Defendants= 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed by the
parties and after at least one Court order demanding that Petitioners plead with more specificity.
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In light of the incredible and burdensome body of work already presented to the Court for
consideration, efficiency would not be well served by the parties abandoning more than a year=s
worth of work to prematurely focus on discovery that is supposed to be conducted in other,
successive stages of the litigation. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)
(recognizing that plaintiffs= burden of proof will vary with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation.@). And the fact that a Second Amended
Petition has been filed does not necessitate the filing of an additional 235 pages of briefs, since
Awith minor exceptions . . . the remainder of plaintiffs= amended complaint is identical to their
First Amended Complaint.@ Def. Mem. p. 3. All issues are fully briefed and ready for the
Court=s consideration.
To be sure, Petitioners B not Defendants B are the ones who usually pursue jurisdictional
discovery, and it is occasionally permitted unless their claims are clearly immaterial, wholly
unsubstantiated and frivolous. See Davis v. Asano Bussan Co., 212 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1954);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1945); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
However, even Petitioners to a lawsuit do not possess an absolute right to discovery prior to the
dismissal of their claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Indeed, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that even A[a] plaintiff has no right to discovery in opposing a motion under 12(b)(1).
Any suggestion to the contrary derived from Williamson v. Tucker . . . must be rejected.@ Haase
v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 908 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987).
Logically, if Petitioners, generally speaking, do not possess a right to jurisdictional
discovery when a complaint could be summarily dismissed, then Defendants certainly have no
right to subject these Petitioners to premature and time consuming discovery, particularly in a
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Rule 12(b) setting where extrinsic evidence is not being presented and the Court=s analysis is
focused on the four-corners of Petitioners= Second Amended Petition. This is so because an
adjudication of the question of standing is not an adjudication on the merits.
In short, Defendants seek jurisdictional discovery when they are not properly entitled to
it. Once the court rules on the pending 12(b)(1) Motion and addresses the issues already fully
briefed and before the Court pursuant to Defendants= earlier filed 12(b)(6) Motion, then the
parties may properly proceed to the discovery phase of the litigation. Until then, the granting of
jurisdictional discovery at this stage B when the Petitioners= allegations are supposed to be
accepted as truth B would force the parties to conduct expensive and time consuming discovery
to ascertain facts that are already appropriately pled and assumed to be accurate for purposes of
determining whether standing is proper.
If the Court wishes the parties to proceed with discovery, then it should deny Defendants=
pending Motion to Dismiss and allow the litigation to proceed to another stage of litigation. If,
however, the Court considers the Aface@ of the Complaint to be inadequate for purposes of
standing, then it should dismiss the lawsuit accordingly. In any event, presently before the Court
is merely a Afacial@ attack on Petitioners= Second Amended Petition, and such an attack on
subject matter jurisdiction simply Arequire[s] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint
are taken as true.@ McCaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
In Williamson v. Tucker, the Fifth Circuit made clear that A[t]he district court
consequently has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on . . . the
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complaint alone.@ 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). But only if the district court goes beyond
the allegations in the complaint and addresses disputed facts should there be an opportunity for
jurisdictional discovery. Id. at 413-14. Nevertheless, in a clever procedural move, Defendants
are attempting to transform a typical and customary 12(b) motion into what is essentially a Rule
56 Motion for Summary Judgment, hoping the Court ignores the distinction between the two.
Defendants take this position because different standards apply when a litigant challenges
standing on a Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b) motion than on a Motion for Summary Judgment under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56.
When a court considers standing on a motion for a Rule 12(b) dismissal, it must accept
the allegations in the pleadings as true. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed=n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990). When a defendant moves for summary judgment because of lack of standing, however,
the Petitioners must then submit affidavits and comparable evidence that indicate that a genuine
issue of fact exists on the standing issue. See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1991).
Thus, the level of factual specificity required to defend against a motion for summary judgment
on the issue of standing is much higher than the standard required in a Rule 12 context.
Defendants, for obvious reasons, do not admit this distinction and seemingly rely on
jurisprudence applying the summary judgment (rather than the motion to dismiss) standard.
Clearly, the burden of establishing the elements of standing is on the party seeking
jurisdiction in the federal courts. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. And Aeach element must be supported
in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with
the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.@ Id.
Evidently then, the requirements of Petitioners with respect to a motion to dismiss and an
-44-

Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP Document 33

Filed 05/20/11 Page 47 of 51

adversarial motion for summary judgment are substantially different. Indeed, A[a]t the pleading
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant=s conduct may suffice.@
Lujan v. Nat=l Wildlife Fed=n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) In contrast, general allegations will not
suffice for summary judgment; specific facts must be adduced instead. See id.
To address Defendants= concerns, if, during the course of regular discovery, evidence is
somehow

discovered that individual Petitioners are not subject to th PPACA=s Individual

Mandate, Defendants may then file a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
alternative, a Afactual@ 12(b)1 Motion to Dismiss the matter for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, since a 12(b)1 motion may be raised at any time, by any party, or even by the Court.
Until then, however, it is proper for Defendants to answer the Petitioners= Amended
Complaint. Furthermore, there is absolutely no need for additional briefing, as the issues before
the Court are already fully briefed and have been since November 15, 2010.
To allow an additional briefing schedule for Petitioners= Second Amended Petition would
be a terrible waste of valuable time, prolonging justice for Petitioners. As already noted, the
legal issues before the Court are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. Moreover, the public
interest is best served by an expeditious resolution of the constitutionality of the PPACA. See
Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Heath & Human Services, 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 223010
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011), citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582
(1985).
CONCLUSION
Defendants make factual arguments as to whether any plaintiffs will suffer an injury,
however, in this 12(b) setting, the court may not weigh evidence or engage in speculation.
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Instead, the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as fact, and Amere allegations of injury
are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss based on lack of standing.@ State of Florida v.
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, (N.D. Fla. 2010), quoting Dep=t of
Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329, (1999); see also Okpalobi v.
Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (in motion to dismiss, Aboth the trial and reviewing
courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party.@). At the 12(b) preliminary stage, Defendants=
attempt to shoehorn Petitioners into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion on the merits is
premature.
Petitioners have alleged that the Individual Mandate will require Petitioners to apply for
and purchase qualifying healthcare insurance, even though they do not have it and do not want it.
Thus, Petitioners have suffered present harm and will be forced either to enter into an economic
transaction they want no part of (and divulge intimate details of their lives to a corporation), or to
face economic penalties. Since Petitioners allege direct economic harm from the PPACA=s
impending mandate, standing to assert their claims clearly exists. See e.g. Okpalobi v. Foster,
190 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Allandale Neighborhood Ass=n v. Austin Transp.
Study Policy Advisory Comm., 840 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding constitutional standing
even though plaintiff=s economic loss remained unrealized until a future date due to present
adverse consequences); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services,
716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1146 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (finding standing to be appropriate in PPACA
challenge for individual plaintiff who simply preferred to direct and divert her resources
elsewhere); Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
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(finding standing in PPACA challenge for Petitioners who alleged financial pressures to
rearrange their affairs); Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va.
2010) (finding in PPACA challenge that A[t]he present or near-future costs of complying with a
statute that has not yet gone into effect can be an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing@);
Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Heath & Human Services, 2011 WL 223010 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
2011) (noting that plaintiffs= complaint plausibly sets forth an injury-in-fact in light of allegations
that they must engage in financial preparation for the impending effective date of the individual
mandate); Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011), hearing in banc denied,
11-5047, 2011 WL 1113489 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2011) (finding that adjusting their finances now
by setting aside money to pay the anticipated penalties is an actual injury).
Plainly, their alleged economic injuries are distinct and palpable and are much more than
mere generalized grievances about how tax dollars may be spent, or based on infringement of a
broad right to constitutional government. Petitioners have not just alleged that they have no
intention of either abiding by the Individual Mandate or paying the penalty, they have strongly
promised in the Complaint that they will resist the statute.
Defendants= requested relief essentially calls upon the Court to evaluate the merits of
Petitioners= causes of action and are misplaced at this threshold standing stage of the litigation. It
is well-established Athat the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts= statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.@ Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (citing generally 5A Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure ' 1350 n.8 and cases cited (2d ed.1990)). As the Supreme Court stated
in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685, A[j]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that
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the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which Plaintiffs could actually recover.@
Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is
proper only when the claim is Aso insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this
Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.@ Steel
Co., 523 U.S. at 89.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petitioners, by undersigned counsel,
respectfully request that this Court issue an Order denying the Defendants= Motion to Dismiss in
Part and for Jurisdictional Discovery and for such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT, RYAN S.
WALTERS, MICHAEL E. SHOTWELL
AND RICHARD A. CONRAD, ON BEHALF
OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED,
By: /s/ Christopher B. McDaniel
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL
By: /s/ K. Douglas Lee
K. DOUGLAS LEE
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL, MSB #10711
BRETT W. ROBINSON, MSB #10006
ROY A. NOWELL, JR., MSB #100768
HORTMAN HARLOW BASSI ROBINSON
& McDANIEL, PLLC
POST OFFICE DRAWER 1409
LAUREL, MS 39441-1409
PHONE: (601) 649-8611
FAX:(601) 649-6979
cmdaniel@hortmanharlow.com
brobinson@hortmanharlow.com
rnowell@hortmanharlow.com
Attorney for Petitioners
K. DOUGLAS LEE, MSB #9887
124 WALNUT CIRCLE, STE. 6
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HATTIESBURG, MS 39401
PHONE: (601) 583-4447
FAX: (601) 450-0152
kdl@leelaw.us
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been served using the
Court’s ECF system, on Friday, May 20, 2011 to the counsel of record for all Defendants
Dated Thursday, May 19, 2011
By: /s/ Christopher B. McDaniel
CHRISTOPHER B. McDANIEL
By: /s/ K. Douglas Lee
K. DOUGLAS LEE
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Virginia Group Health Insurance Medical History Form
Section 1: To Be Completed by Employer
EMPLOYER GROUP NAME

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 2: Employee Information

Employee Name:
Employee Address: (street, city, state & zip)
Name of Current Insurer/HMO:
Spouse Name:
Spouse Address: (street, city, state & zip)
Name of Current Insurer/HMO:

SSN:

SSN:

INDICATE THE TYPE OF COVERAGE FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING:  Employee Only  Employee and Spouse
 Employee and One Child  Employee and Children
 Employee and Family
Section 3: Waiver of Coverage
Only complete this section if you wish to decline coverage for yourself, your spouse, other adult and/or your dependents.
I WISH TO DECLINE COVERAGE FOR:
 Myself
 My Spouse
 Other Adult
 My Dependents
 Myself and All Dependents
I WISH TO DECLINE COVERAGE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

 Covered under other group coverage.
Name of Insurer/HMO:
Name of Insured:
 Covered by Medicare  Covered by TRICARE or CHAMPVA
 Other (including individual coverage)
(provide details)
My employer has given me an opportunity to apply for group health coverage for myself and my dependents (if applicable).
I have declined to apply for coverage as indicated above. I understand that by waiving coverage at this time, certain
restrictions may apply to my ability to participate in this group insurance program at a later date.
Signature:
Date:
Section 4: Medical History
Please provide the following information about each person to be covered by this policy. If you require more space than is
provided, attach additional papers. If child(ren) do not reside at the same address as the employee, please provide the
child(ren)’s address.

First Name &
Middle Initial

Last Name (if
different from
applicant)

Gender
M/F

Date of Birth
mm/dd/yyyy

Height

Employee
Spouse
Child

Address if different from employee: (street, city, state & zip)

Virginia Group Health Insurance Medical History Form
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Weight

Step
Child
Y/N

Court-Ordered
Coverage
Y/N
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Employee Name:______________________________
Section 4: Medical History (con’t.)

First Name &
Middle Initial

Last Name (if
different from
applicant)

Gender
M/F

Date of Birth
mm/dd/yyyy

Height

Weight

Step
Child
Y/N

Court-Ordered
Coverage
Y/N

Child

Address if different from employee: (street, city, state & zip)
Child

Address if different from employee: (street, city, state & zip)
Child

Address if different from employee: (street, city, state & zip)
Child

Address if different from employee: (street, city, state & zip)
Child

Address if different from employee: (street, city, state & zip)
If you or your spouse are a custodial parent to any dependent listed above, indicate who:
Within the past five (5) years, have you or any other person listed on this form consulted or sought treatment, had treatment
recommended, received treatment or therapy, been surgically treated, had surgery recommended, been hospitalized or
taken any medication for any of the following conditions?
When answering questions on this medical history form, the information provided for each individual should include only
information about that individual and should not include any genetic information. Genetic information includes family
medical history and information related to the individual’s genetic counseling or genetic diseases for which the individual
may be at risk. All responses pertaining to an individual will only be considered and applied to the individual in question.
Yes
No
Condition
1. AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) or HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus)
2. Alcohol abuse, substance abuse, and/or use of illicit drugs
3. Allergies
4. Aneurysm
5. Arthritis, rheumatism or other condition affecting one or more joints
6. Asthma or other lung or respiratory disorder disease, emphysema, COPD, cystic fibrosis, sarcodosis,
tuberculosis
7. Back disorders, including disorders of the spine and intervertebral discs, and disc herniation/bulge
8. Blood clots, peripheral vascular disease or other circulatory or vascular disorder
9. Cancer or any tumor or growth
10. Diabetes - If yes, what type?
11. Elevated Cholesterol
Virginia Group Health Insurance Medical History Form
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Employee Name:______________________________

Section 4: Medical History (con’t.)
Yes
No
Condition
12. Emotional or mental disorders, including, but not limited to, depression, manic depression, bi-polar
disorder or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
13. Fibroidcystic breast or other breast disorders
14. Fractures/Limb loss
15. Gall stones or any other gallbladder disorder
16. Gout
17. Head, spinal cord injuries
18. Heart or cardiovascular disorders, including, but not limited to, heart attack, heart murmur, irregular
heart rate, valve disorders, angina or chest pain
19. Hemophilia, anemia, sickle cell anemia, or other blood disorder
20. Hepatitis – If yes, what type?
21. Hypertension (high blood pressure)
22. Intestinal disorders, including, but not limited to, diverticulitis, hernia, rectal disorders, colitis or Crohn’s
Disease
23. Kidney disorders, including, but not limited to, kidney failure, kidney stones, bladder or genitourinary
diseases or disorders, polycystic kidney disease, renal failure or on dialysis
24. Liver disorders, including, but not limited to, cirrhosis
25. Lupus, scleroderma, fibromyalgia, vasculitis, or any other connective tissue disorders
26. Nervous system disorders, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, seizures, paralysis, multiple
sclerosis, cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy, Parkinson’s Disease
27. Prostate, testicular, erectile dysfunction
28. Reproductive disorders: abnormal uterine bleeding, fibroids, menstrual disorders, endometriosis,
infertility, other
29. Sleep Apnea
30. Stroke or TIA (mini stroke)
31. Thyroid, goiter, glandular diseases or disorders, pituitary, pancreatic, or disorder requiring growth
hormone
32. Ulcers, acid reflux or other disorders of the stomach
33. If you checked yes to any conditions in Section 4, please provide full details on each medical condition below.
List
Medications
by name,
dosage and
give route
Is Ongoing
Condition
(oral,
Treatment
(include start
Types of
injectable,
Needed? If
Question
date of
Treatment
infusion, or
Yes, Please
Physicians
Number
Name of Person
condition)
(Month/Year)
inhaled)
Explain:
Name

Virginia Group Health Insurance Medical History Form
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Employee Name:______________________________

Section 4: Medical History (con’t.)

Question
Number

Name of Person

Condition
(include start
date of
condition)

Types of
Treatment
(Month/Year)

List
Medications
by name,
dosage, and
give route
(oral,
injectable,
infusion, or
inhaled)

Is Ongoing
Treatment
Needed? If
Yes, Please
Explain:

Physicians
Name

34. List any prescribed medications not otherwise identified in Section 4, number 33 (including fertility drugs) that you, your
spouse, or any of your dependents listed on this form are currently taking. Use additional papers if needed.
List Medications by name, dosage, and give
Name of Person
route (oral, injectable, infusion, or inhaled)
For what condition?

Virginia Group Health Insurance Medical History Form
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Employee Name:______________________________

Section 5: Additional Information
1. Has anyone named in this application used tobacco products within the past 12 months?

If yes, explain:

2. Within the past five (5) years, have you or any other person listed on this form, consulted or sought treatment, had
treatment recommended, received treatment or therapy, been surgically treated, had surgery recommended, hospitalized
for, or taken medication for any medical condition or disorder not mentioned above? If yes, explain:

3. Are you or anyone listed on this form currently pregnant?
If you checked yes, please explain:

If yes, Due Date:

4. Any future surgeries or treatment discussed, planned or recommended in the next 12 months? If yes, explain:

Section 6: Certification and Enrollment
In connection with this application for coverage with the insurer(s)/HMO(s) identified below, I certify that I have
read, or have had read to me, this completed form, and I realize that any act or practice that constitutes fraud or
intentional material misrepresentation of fact in this form may result in loss or rescission of coverage. I
acknowledge that all claims relating to such fraudulent act, practice or intentional material misrepresentations of fact will
become my responsibility if incurred after termination or as a result of rescission.
I understand and agree that the insurer(s)/HMO(s) identified below will rely upon the above information and answers as the
basis for establishing group premium rates for health care coverage.
I authorize any physician, medical practitioner, hospital, clinic, other medical or medically related facility, insurer(s)/HMO(s)
or other organization, institution or person that has any knowledge of my health or the health of my spouse and/or
dependents as listed on this form to disclose such information to the extent permitted by law to the insurer(s)/HMO(s)
identified below for the purpose of compiling an accurate evaluation of this form and to establish group premium rates for
the group. This authorization does not permit the use or disclosure of psychotherapy notes. Authorization to disclose
information for the payment of claims is valid for the term of coverage and in connection with application for coverage, policy
reinstatement or a request for change in policy benefits, this authorization shall be valid for thirty (30) months from the date
shown below.
I understand that I may be contacted by the insurer(s)/HMO(s) identified below to obtain additional follow-up information on
health conditions disclosed in Section 4 and 5 of this document for me, my spouse and/or my covered dependents.
I understand that I or my authorized representative may receive a copy of this authorization upon request. I agree that a
photographic copy of this authorization shall be as valid as the original.
Full and proper corporate name of Insurer(s)/HMO(s)

Employee Signature:

Daytime Tel. No.

Virginia Group Health Insurance Medical History Form
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Date:

Print

Clear Form

